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NATURE OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY
EvERY community and particularly the world community has many
parts, each of which, in our dynamic age, is continuously changing.
Attempts to define these parts, to describe the processes of change, to
measure rates of change, and to analyze the influence of changes upon
the relationships of the parts and upon the life of the community as a
whole are likely to appear dogmatic and unreal. Communities, like all
living things, resist mechanical division and abstract definition. Life
implies both cooperation and opposition among parts of the living
thing 1 and involves processes the functioning of which gives unity to
the whole. 2 But these parts and processes cannot be identified and
separated by sharp definitions. The geographic areas, temporal oscilla-
tions, and functional processes of communities are in continual flux.
Permanent boundaries are possible only when life has ceased.
Nevertheless, both politicians and social scientists persist in assigning
major social and political ills to "disharmonies," "maladjustments,"
or "lags" implying that different parts or processes of a community
can be examined independently and their changes compared with one
another.3 We are painfully aware that the policies of different nations
conflict. We can easily perceive that the different regions and areas of
the world are unequally developed technologically and politically.
Culture in some areas appears to be centuries behind that in others.
Taking the world as a whole, it has been suggested that natural science
has outstripped political science, that a twentieth century technology
is beyond the capacities of Neanderthal human nature to manage, 4
that political nationalism is out of harmony with economic interde-
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pendence, 5 that political myths are maladjusted to economic realities,G
that reactionary ideologies are in conflict with revolutionary utopias.7
Among the many possible analyses of the processes which maintain a
community as a whole, that which distinguishes its technology, its
science, its opinion, and its organization seems well adapted for study-
ing world politics. Sociologists characterize a community by the
abundance of communication among its members (which in large
communities usually varies with its progress in technology), by the
degree of similarigy of its members (which in the traits important for
civilization varies with its progress in and diffusion of kmowledge), by
the degree of harmony among its members (which usually varies with
the homogeneity of its public opinion), and by the capacity of the com-
munity to act as a unit (which is likely to vary with the degree of
centralization of its organization).
Within the world community there are very considerable local dif-
ferences. The processes of technology, of science, of opinion and of
organization are changing at different rates and even in different direc-
tions. Furthermore, the rates and directions of change differ in dif-
ferent areas. Tensions because of such lags and disharmonies have
been worldwide, tending to world war. They have also been inter-
national, tending to international war, and intranational, tending to
civil war.
With this order of thought, the definition of these processes of the
world community and the measurement of the rate and direction of
their changes, generally and locally, may provide a basis for predicting
the future of world politics and also for controlling it.0
TRENDs OF TECHNOLOGY AND or OPINION
Difficulty arises, however, because certain of these processes appear
to exhibit little continuity or trend in their changes, but vary spas-
modically and unpredictably. This is less true of technology and sci-
ence than of opinion and organization. Men have always been invent-
ing and utilizing devices for communicating, for transporting persons
and things, and for transforming natural resources to human purposes.
They have also been employing methods and ideas for discovering
regularities, for predicting the future and for controlling nature. In
these processes of technology and science nations, civilizations, and
even the human race as a whole have advanced progressively and
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cumulatively, and at an accelerating rate. One generation has built
on the shoulders of its predecessors. There have been setbacks in this
progress in local areas following the death of nations and civilizations.
Technology and science retrogressed in Europe in the dark ages and in
China in the 'age of warring states, but in general man has moved
steadily forward in his capacity to eliminate space, to utilize his natural
environment, to recall his social past, and to understand natural
phenomena.10
Opinions and organizations, however, have exhibited much less con-
tinuity. There is today a wide diversity of religious beliefs, moral
codes, political philosophies and economic theories. History discloses
little continuity in the acceptance and interpretation of such standards.
While cumulative development of social ideals can be traced in the
opinions of large groups over long periods, as for example the ideals of
humanity, liberty, tolerance and reasonableness since the Renais-
sance," history as a whole records the rise, decline and recurrence of
social ideas and institutions.'2 Ideas of social equality have been suc-
ceeded by ideas of social inequality, ideas of liberty by ideas of obe-
dience, the idea of a universal god by the idea of many national gods,
ideas of rationalism by ideas of irrationalism, ideas of humanism by
ideas of self-interested expediency, ideas of free economic enterprise by
ideas of centralized economic organization, ideas of a world community
under law by ideas of ceaseless struggle between nations and groups.
Social experiments have seldom been so conclusive that apparent
failures will not be tried again under new conditions or that apparent
successes will not be abandoned when conditions change. Such changes
have usually been accompanied by considerable social violence.
REVOLUTIONARY TRANSITIONS
This apparent unpredictability of changes in opinions and. organiza-
tions may be a consequence of their dependence both upon ancient
traditions and upon contemporary conditions of science and technology.
Continual adaptation of social opinions and organizations is necessary
if man is to take advantage of new inventions and discoveries. Institu-
tions and organizations, however, depend so much on custom and
habit for their smooth functioning that such adaptation causes social
disorder. Furthermore, men acquire an emotional attachment to
traditional beliefs and institutions.'3 There is, consequently, a tend-
ency for opinions and organizations, ill-adapted to the present condi-
10. SARTON, INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE (1927) Introductory Chapter.
11. WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 169 et seg.
12. 1 TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY (1st ed. 1934).
13. ALEXANDER, OUR AGE OF UNREASON (1942) 339; WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 1, at
403-5.
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tions of science and technology, to persist until their obsolescence
becomes so obvious to many that change takes place with revolutionary
violence. In his Study of History, Arnold J. Toynbee has illustrated
this process in the transition from one civilization to another usually
with dark ages between, and in the transition in the structure of each
civilization from a heroic age of pioneering conflict, to the troublous
times of a progressively less stable balance of power, followed by a
period of a universal state, and then that of a universal church which
may contain the germs of a new civilization as the old civilization
declines and falls.' 4
To avoid the violence of transitions, which has sometimes caused
retrogression for several centuries in the progress even of science and
technology, the lag of opinions and organizations behind science and
technology should be narrowed. Such a narrowing is not likely to
prove practicable, however, unless men show a greater willingness than
they have in the past to abandon traditional opinions which cannot be
realized under existing conditions, and to modify historic institutions
and organizations based upon such obsolete opinions. Furthermore,
continuous adaptation of opinions and organizations to contemporary
material conditions necessarily destroys their adaptation to the cus-
toms of human society and the habits of individual human minds. A
compromise is consequently necessary which can be effected only by a
continuing effort of education and information. In the present dynamic
age when the steam engine, the telegraph, the radio, the airplane and
nuclear fission have followed each other in rapid succession, education
cannot be effective in promoting this adaptation if it seeks to demon-
strate eternal truth or historic tradition. Instead it must develop a
sense of responsibility in every individual to think things through in
the light of the present and the probable future."x
The accomplishments and failures of past efforts at world organiza-
tion should, therefore, be judged by their success (1) in meeting the
political and economic problems arising from the impact of new dis-
coveries and inventions on customary modes of thought and (2) in
changing those modes of thought to modes of thought better adapted to
contemporary conditions.
Organizations and institutions have often attempted to effect such
adaptations not by changing traditions but by changing conditions
to the more primitive situation in which the traditions arose. While an
adaptation might be effected in this way, and in fact has been in "dark
ages", it may be assumed that that form of adaptation is not desired
by many people in the contemporary world and would not be prac-
ticable in the long run. The clock of science and invention cannot be
14. WIMGHT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 103-119,678.
15. Id. at 1456.
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permanently turned back. Eventually opinions and organizations
must be adapted to advances in science and technology although there
are usually many choices in the form of that adaptation.
THE ORGANIZATION OF MODERN CIVILIZATION
Modern civilization, which began in Europe with the discovery of
new continents and the rediscovery of ancient civilizations at the time
of the Renaissance, has experienced several periods characterized by
distinctive types of organization and opinion. It began with a con-
tinuance of the religious tradition of medieval Christendom, tinctured
by notions of objective science and cultural relativity and politically
disorganized by the struggles of national monarchies equipped with
firearms in war, the printing press in peace, and Machiavellian policies,
at all times. After the Reformation and the Thirty Years' War, the
concept of balance of power among sovereign territorial states guided
the policy of princes and became the political organization of Europe.
The American and French revolutions and the recognition of Latin
American, Asiatic and African states made the state system worldwide
and reduced the influence of the European and Christian tradition in
the opinion which sustained that system. These revolutions developed
the ideas of individual liberty and equality which had been latent in
the ideas of the Renaissance and the Reformation. They also had an
important influence in developing ideas of nationalism and inter-
nationalism.
The concept of a concert of the great powers was practiced after the
Napoleonic wars as a means for preserving the balance of power. After
the nationalistic wars of the mid-nineteenth century, international
administration of technical services, the codification of international
law, and the international arbitration of disputes ,of a legal character
gave a certain reality to internationalism so long as the balance of
power remained comparatively stable under the influence of British
sea power and finance. At the same time the idea of self-determination
of nationalities, the protection of national minorities, and the emancipa-
tion of dependencies gave a renewed vigor to the concept of nationalism
as it had been expounded by Mazzini.
The League of Nations sought to give harmony and form to these
diverse tendencies. Accepting the basic structure of national territorial
states, it sought to encourage peaceful change in the direction of
national self-determination, emancipation of colonies and freedom of
trade, and to adjust controversies by arbitration, conciliation or con-
sultation within the 'theory of international law which recognized the
sovereign independence of states. The League of Nations, therefore,
depended primarily on the influence of reason and persuasion. An
element of power, however, existed in the predominance of the concert
[Vol, 5.. 870
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of great powers with permanent representation in the Council and in
the anticipation that the United States and Great Britain, who to-
gether controlled most of the world's sea power and available finance,
would be able to exercise a leadership and to bring effective pressures
of an economic character to support the resolutions of the League's
Council and Assembly. In form, Article 16 of the Covenant recognized
the equality of states and left it to each state to appreciate its obliga-
tions to engage in sanctions against a state which resorted to war in
violation of its covenants, but it was anticipated that the reality of
Anglo-American solidarity in the use of sea power and finance would
give practical effect to these provisions.
The abstention of the United States from the League and the grow-
ing importance of the Soviet Union, not an original member of the
League, eliminated this expectation, and the League was in practice
reduced to an instrument for formulating opinion and facilitating per-
suasion. World politics reverted to power politics but without the
capacity of Great Britain alone to maintain the balance which had
preserved stability during the nineteenth century.
Nevertheless, the successes of the League in applying the techniques
of pacific settlement in many cases, in developing international ad-
ministrative services in many fields, and in educating peoples to the
need of even more effective international organization laid the founda-
tion for new effort and during the 1920's created a considerable hope
that a long period of peace might be expected. The economic collapse
and the rise of aggressive governments during the 1930's shattered this
hope, but the experience with the League and with World War II
eliminated policies of isolationism even in the United States and the
Soviet Union. The need of international cooperation both for security
and for prosperity was recognized in nearly all countries.
In the meantime, however, the material conditions of the world had
changed through the development of inventions and practices which
had the effect of increasing international communication and transport,
governmentalizing economies, concentrating military, political and
economic power, and augmenting the vulnerability of all peoples to
the destruction of war. The form of international organization which
might have been adapted to conditions of 1920 was not adequate to
meet conditions of 1945. It may even be doubted whether the organiza-
tion of the United Nations, which took form before Hiroshima, is
adequate to the conditions of the atomic age.
TRANSITIONS IN TE FoPum OF WORLD ORGANIZATION
Although history is continuous and some form of organization al-
ways regulates the relations of peoples in contact with one another,
forms of organization may undergo relatively rapid transition at cer-
, THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
tain periods usually characterized by war and violence. Such transition
may be accelerated and become turbulent because of an inherent con-
tradiction between the mode of organizing security and prosperity
which has existed and that which new conditions require.
As an illustration, systems of states regulated by an equilibrium of
power can hardly move gradually into a system of states regulated by
law because the functioning of the two systems calls upon states to
behave in manners which are mutually contradictory. Stability
through power politics can only result if each state maintains its own
defenses comparably with that of its neighbors, niaintains the freedom
and the capacity of its government to act rapidly and decisively, and
promptly joins in temporary alliance or common action to decrease
the relative power of a state which is becoming so powerful as to
threaten its neighbors. Power must be the dominant criterion. If
other considerations enter into the policy of any state of importance
in the balance, the stability of the entire system will be impaired. 10
On the other hand, stability through law can only result if each
member of the community limits its defensive measures to those which
the law permits, subordinates its policy to the general law, and utilizes
the procedures of the general law for determining, protecting and
modifying its rights. Law must be the dominant criterion. If other con-
siderations predominate in the policy of states or groups of states, too
large to be controlled by the agencies of law enforcement for the com-
munity as a whole, the stability of the entire system will be imperilled.
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND PREVENTIVE WAR
It is clearly impossible for states to be guided predominantly at the
same time by precepts both of power and of law. The difficulty was
recognized by the early writers on international law in discussing the
justice of war to preserve the balance of power. Beginning with the
Spanish Dominican Francis of Victoria in the sixteenth century, the
classical writers recognized that war was not justified except against a
state that violated the law. 17 Yet a state might dangerously increase in
power without violating the law. Alberico Gentili at the Court of
Queen Elizabeth, thoroughly versed in Italian balance of power politics
and quoting with approval the opinion of Lorenzo de Medici "that the
balance of powers should be maintained among the princes of Italy,"
denied as a jurist "that it is just to resort to a war of this kind as soon
as anyone becomes too powerful" because a prince may "have his
power increased by succession and election." "Will you assail him in
16. Id. at 757, 1493.
17. FRANCISCUS DE VIcToRu, DE JURE Bm.LI (Carnegie ed., Bate's trans. 1917) § 13,
See also AYALA, DE JuRE ET OFFicus BELLICIS ET DISCIPLINA MiLiTARI (Carnegie ed,,
Bate's trans. 1912) c. 2, § 11.
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war," writes Gentili, "because his power may possibly be dangerous to
you? Some other reason must be added for justice's sake." 15
Hugo Grotius in the midst of the Thirty Years' War elaborated the
same point.
"We have said above that fear with respect to a neighboring
power is not a sufficient cause. For in order that a self-defense
may be lawful it must be necessary; and it is not necessary unless
we are certain, not only regarding the power of our neighbor, but
also rejarding his intention; the degree of certainty required is that
which is accepted in morals.
"Wherefore we can in nowise approve the view of those who
declare that it is a just cause of war when a neighbor who is re-
strained by no agreement builds a fortress on his own soil, or some
other fortification which may some day cause us harm. Against
the fears which arise from such actions we must resort to counter-
fortifications on our own land and other similar remedies, but not
to force of arms." 19
Samuel Pufendorf 20 and Christian Wolff 21 similarly distinguished
the expediency from the justice of wars. Emmerich Vattel, vriting
realistically in the midst of the Seven Years' War, emphasized the
importance of maintaining the balance of power, but adds:
"... Since war is only permissible in order to redress an injury
received, or to protect ourselves from an injury with which we are
threatened, it is a sacred rule of the Law of Nations that the ag-
grandizement of a State cannot alone and of itself give anyone the
right to take up arms to resist it.
"Suppqsing, then, that no injury has been received from that
State, we must have reason to think ourselves threatened with one
before we may lawfully take up arms. Now, power alone does not
constitute a threat of injury; the will to injure must accompany
the power. It is unfortunate for the human race that the will to
oppress can almost always be believed to exist where there is found
the power to do so with impunity. But the two are not necessarily
inseparable; and the only right which results from the fact that
they ordinarily or frequently go together is that first appearances
may be taken as a sufficient proof. As soon as a State has given
evidence of injustice, greed, pride, ambition, or a desire of domi-
neering over its neighbors, it becomes an object of suspicion which
they must guard against." 2
18. 2 GENTILI, DE JunE BELLi (Carnegie ed., Rolfe's trans. 1933) 66.
19. 2 GRoTius, DE JuRE BELLi Ac PACs (Carnegie ed., Kelsey's trans. 1925) c. 22, § 5.
20. 8 PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GEN-ritni (1688) c. 6, § 5.
21. WoLFF, JUs GENTIUM- METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRAcrMTUM (1749) c. 6, t5 617,
646-52.
22. 3 VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS (1758) (Carnegie ed., Fenwick's Trans. 1916) c. 3,
§ 44, at 248-9.
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Vattel then speaks at length of the duty of the state to take pre-
cautions proportionate to the risk and to take advantage of even the
"smallest wrong" by an over-powerful state to make demands, but if
the "powerful state is both just and prudent in its conduct and gives
no ground for complaint", force cannot be used against it though
counter-alliance may be appropriate. Such a balancing of power by
diplomacy, Vattel considers both legitimate and prudent. If this fails
and the balance of power becomes disturbed,
"The safest plan.., is either to weaken one who upsets the bal-
ance of power, as soon as a favorable opportunity can be found when
we can do so with justice, or, by the use of all upright means, to
prevent him from attaining so formidable a degree of power. To
this end all Nations should be on their guard above all not to allow
him to increase his power by force of arms, and this they are
always justified in doing." 23
If the disturbance of the balance is due to the construction of for-
tresses or increase of armament by a state, attack upon that state is
not justifiable unless there is evidence of intended perfidy. The only
remedy is defensive military preparation and alliances, policies likely
to lead to armament races which are both expensive and dangerous to
the peace. 24 Vattel's difficulty in reconciling the expediency of preven-
tive wars to maintain the balance of power with the injustice of wars
undertaken merely for that purpose is clear, and his extended advice
by no means solved the difficulty.
Nineteenth century writers generally followed Vattel's lead, although
they somewhat changed his terminology. They recognized the political
expediency of maintaining the balance of power while insisting that
armed intervention merely for that purpose is not legally permissible. 2
To summarize, international lawyers have agreed that if states
consistently follow the precepts of the balance of power, they will
weaken law as an instrument of security. If, however, they follow law
in all circumstances, the balance of power is likely to become so dis-
turbed that the security of all will be imperilled, assuming that the
community lacks effective processes of law enforcement. Consequently,
the sanctions of law must become adequate all at once if law is to be
substituted for the balance of power.
"If they are not adequate, subjects of the law will not aban-
don the right of self-help, or if they do abandon it will become
victims of their own confidence in an inadequate system as did
23. Id. § 49, at 251-2.
24. Id. § 50, at 252-3.
25. See 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1935) § 136; WILSON, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw (3d ed. 1939) 64.
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Ethiopia and Czechoslovakia [in the 1930's]. If the force of a
State is adequate to defend its own right, it will also be sufficient
in some cases to defy the law. Consequently an unorganized bal-
ance of power system contains no guaranty against lawlessness.
As a result of these circumstances, the establishment of a system of
international sanctions, assuring that the power behind law is
greater than the power of any law-breaker or any probable com-
bination of law-breakers, cannot take place gradually. Unless such
sanctions are made sufficiently powerful all at once, they may be
worse than useless." '-
THE, ORGANIZATION OF SECURITY AND OF PROSPERITY
Probably the same dilemma exists between an economic system
regulated by free market processes and an economic system regulated
by central planning. The first fails to assure prosperity if government
operation and regulation of industry become so great that basic price
adjustments cannot be made through the market. Central planning,
however, cannot assure prosperity if so large a sphere of economic
activity is left to free enterprise that a comprehensive plan cannot be
administered. A government cannot plan more than a small fraction
of the national economy and maintain a free enterprise system at the
same time.
The suggestion, however, that there is an incompatibility between
the balance of power and world law as bases of security, and also an
incompatibility between free enterprise and government planning as
the basis of prosperity, should not be understood to imply that there
is any incompatibility between world law and free enterprise. In fact
the reverse may be true. There may be an incompatibility between
world law and highly governmentalized economies.-" Law functions
best when the natural and artificial persons who are its subjects are
relatively weak in comparison with the community as a whole.
The difficulty of the situation lies in the fact that governments, even
if they realize the incompatibilities between different systems of
security and of prosperity are not entirely free to choose the system
which they, and the public opinion under which they function, desire.
Conditions of technology and science may be such that even with the
fullest support of opinion and the most suitable organization a policy,
perhaps feasible under other conditions, cannot be made to work. What
is practicable depends on both conditions and opinions. But conditions
genuinely 2 imposed by technological and scientific advance are so
difficult to alter that opinions must be adjusted to them.
26. Wright, Peace and Political Organizaion in I,;TErNTioiATL Co.;CIX.AT1 .o; (1941)
457.
27. WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1169-72.
28. Whether technological changes have rendered obsolete the opinion which has stt>
tained free enterprise economy is highly controversial. See HAYEE, THE Ro.%w To SnnRMOM
(1944) 43 et seq.
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There is, it is true, always a considerable range of choice among
policies either of security or of prosperity, and in general this range
probably widens as science and technology advance, but at the same
time science and technology establish conditions difficult to alter
which impose important limits upon the range of choice. Europe could
not be a world in itself after Columbus. The horse and buggy age was
gone after Henry Ford. The Wright brothers greatly reduced the
influence of sea power in the history of the future. Since Hiroshima,
no city can feel secure during war. A security system which relies
heavily upon geographical distance and geographical barriers is today
obsolete.
EVALUATION OF RECENT SYSTEMS OF WORLD ORGANIZATION
With these considerations in mind, attention may be given to the
three systems of world organization which have been attempted since
the Napoleonic wars: (1) balance of power under the Concert of Europe
conducted by the British Empire, (2) balance of power under the
League of Nations, and (3) balance of power under the United Nations.
The first of these systems appears to have worked the best.2" It
kept comparative peace for the century between the battles of Waterloo
and the Marne, whereas the League of Nations kept the peace for less
than twenty years, and opinion seems divided whether the United
Nations can keep it even that long.
This comparison, however, does not mean that the British system
was best in an absolute sense, only that it was best relative to the con-
ditions which it faced. It' failed in 1914 and was not completely suc-
cessful during the twenty years of nationalistic wars in Europe, the
Americas and Asia from 1850 to 1870.30 This system rested on a wide-
spread opinion which acquiesced in the dominance of British sea power
and finance, in the British theory of economic and civil liberties, in the
functioning of the great power concert in Europe, and in the principles
of international law supporting territorial sovereignty, localizing wars,
and regulating intergovernmental relations not directly related to
national security. The adequacy of this system was destroyed by the
diminution of the influence of Britain's sea power consequent upon the
invention of the submarine and the airplane and the rise of American,
Japanese and German sea power; by the diminution of the influence of
29. Wright, The Historical Circumstances of Enduring Peace (1942) 2 ANN. REP. AmiER-
ICAN HISTORICAL ASS'N. 361.
30. The worst wars of the century were the Taiping Rebellion in China (1850-64), the
Lopez war of Paraguay (1865-70), and the American Civil War (1861-5). The Crimean
(1854-6), Italian (1859), Austro-Prussian (1866) and Franco-Prussian (1870-1) wars oc-
curred in Europe during the same period but were much less costly in life and property.
Id. at 365.
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British liberalism consequent upon the rise of rival centers of finance
and industry, the diffusion of socialistic theories, the increasing political
influence of labor, and the increasing control of economies by govern-
ments and international cartels; by the serious disturbance to the
equilibrium in Europe consequent upon the development of German
military and industrial power, the weakening of the independent posi-
tion of the Hapsburg monarchy faced by dissident nationalities, the
corruption of Czarism in Russia, the static condition of the French
population, the rise of non-European great powers and the increasing
influence of democracy on the conduct of foreign policy; and by the
agitation for self-determination in Eastern Europe, in Asia, and in the
colonies consequent upon the diffusion of European military and in-
dustrial techniques and European ideas of liberty, equality and na-
tionality. Under these conditions Britain in the twentieth century was
unable to maintain the equilibrium of Europe and of the world as she
had during the nineteenth century.3'
The Nineteenth Century Pax Brittanica was more successful in
dealing peacefully with international problems as they arose than in
educating opinion to the need for change. It was in large measure an
automatic and static system which lacked processes for peacefully
adapting itself to the new conditions of the twentieth century.
The League of Nations, established after a World War had em-
phasized the need for change in world organization, was intended by
its founders to carry on the nineteenth-century system by adding
American sea power to British, committing the United States to
economic liberalism and international cooperation, restoring European
equilibrium by German and eventually general disarmament, extend-
ing and co-ordinating international cooperation in non-political mat-
ters, and drawing the teeth of nationalism by accepting its main
theses: self-determination of nationalities, gradual liberation of colo-
nies, and international protection of minorities . 2 While the main
assumptions of international law were accepted, the League, particu-
larly after it was buttressed by the Pact of Paris, in principle eliminated
the legitimacy of aggressive war and of neutrality. 3 The League wis
31. VRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 298-300,758-66.
32. RAPPARD, THE QUESTr FOR PEACE SINCE THE WORLD WAR (1940) 474 el eg.
33. Wright, The Outlawry of War (1925) 19 Am. J. IN-r. L. 76; Wright, Neutrality and
Neutral Rights Following the Pact of Paris (1930) Pnoc. Ani. Soc. IN . L. 79; Wright, The
Meaning of the Pact of Paris (1933) 27 Am_. J. INT. L. 39; Wright, The Preset Status of
Neutrality (1940) 34 Ams. J. IxT. L. 391; WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 891-4; Buda Pest
Articles of Interpretation, Report (1934) 38th Co.w. INT. L. Ass'N 66; H-Lvum RnssAnca
ON INTRmATioNAL LAw, Draft Convention on Aggression (1939) 33 Am. J. INTr. L. Sunp.
823; Att'y Gen. Jackson, Address at Habana, Cuba (1941) 35 Ass. J. Iht. L. 348, 354; Re-
port on Trial of War Criminals (June 7, 1945), Agreement for the Establishment of an Ir,
ternational Military Tribunal (Aug. 8, 1945), Indictment of Goering et al. before In!. Mil.
Tribunal (Oct. 18, 1945) in DEFT. OF STATE, TRIAL OF WAR CRmN,%us (1945).
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an effort gradually to supersede the balance of power by effective inter-
national law, utilizing the experience of the international unions and
the Hague conferences. It might have effected the transition suffi-
ciently rapidly to be successful if the United States had accepted it.
Without American support the system of security in the inter-war
period was less a League of Nations system than a balance of power
system without the balancing activity of predominant British sea
power. 34
Today the situation is radically different from that of 1920. The
power of Britain and the importance of sea power itself are greatly
reduced. War equipped with air power, rockets, and atom bombs is
far more destructive than ever before. Power is more concentrated,
and the hands in which it primarily resides-the United States and the
Soviet Union-, are less similar in their economic organization and
social outlook than were the two greatest powers of the earlier period,
the United States and Great Britain. Faith in liberalism has declined in
the face of the immediate success of Soviet totalitarianism. Thus the
tensions of the world, politically between nationalism and international-
ism and economically between free economy and governmentalized
economy, are tremendously augmented. Technology and science have
made tremendous advances. Opinions and organizations are less
adapted to these advances than they were after World War I. 35
Reviewing the situation in the light of human history as a whole,
it appears that conditions are present which have in the past led to the
termination of systems of power equilibrium. The number of great
powers has been reduced, the relative superiority of these powers ovei
the lesser powers has increased, war techniques have become more
destructive, the contacts of states have become closer, and economy
has become less free. In past civilizations such conditions have fre-
quently led to conquest of the entire area of the civilization by one
state. The equilibrium of power has sometimes been superseded by
the universal state."
THE UNITED NATIONS
With these considerations in mind, it is not to be anticipated that
the system which worked in the nineteenth century under British
34. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS, 1919-1939 (1939) 39, 277, 298; RAPPARD, Op.
cit. supra note 32, at 486 et seq.; BENES, CoULBORN and FEILER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
(1939); WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1055 et seq.
35. MORGENTHAU (Ed.), PEACE, SECURITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS (1946); ARNOLD,
OPPENHEIMER, LIPPMAN, UREY et al., ONE WORLD OR NONE (1946).
36. The transitions from the Period of Warring States to the First Emperor in China
(221 B.C.) and from the Hellenistic Period to the Roman Empire (31 B.C.) illustrate the
development of this condition. See 1 TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY (1st ed. 1934);, WRIGHT,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 117, 463, 575 et seg., 760-66.
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hegemony or the system which might have worked in the 1920's
through the League of Nations will work today. WVill the United
Nations be more adequate? Its Charter relies upon a balance of power
among the "super-powers" permanently represented in the Security
Council, upon the capacity and will of those powers to preserve the
peace among the lesser states so long as they maintain their solidarity,
upon the development of economic and social cooperation through
autonomous organizations coordinated by the General Assembly and
the Economic and Social Council, upon processes of gradual self-
determination of colonies through the Trusteeship Council, and upon
the development of methods for protecting human rights and funda-
mental freedoms. The United Nations, therefore, combines aspects of
several different systems of political organization. It may be con-
sidered a world empire governed by the great powers as a unit. It may
be considered a balance of power among the great powers. It may be
considered a world federation organized in the General Assembly and
the Economic and Social Council. Finally, it may be considered an
ethical system depending upon the self restraint of states in respecting
the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political in-
dependence, non-intervention in domestic matters, abstention from
aggression, and pacific settlement set forth in the first chapter of the
Charter.
The Charter has been criticized as attempting to combine incompat-
ible systems of power and of law. Probably the Achilles heel of the
United Nations is its dependence upon the maintenance of a stable
balance of power among the permanent members of the Security Coun-
cil. That equilibrium, primarily between the United States, Britain
and Russia with the first two frequently acting together, has not shown
signs of stability up to date. In principle it is difficult to see how an
equilibrium between only two centers of power can be stable. In gen-
eral, the stability of a political equilibrium increases with the number
of relatively equal states contributing to that equilibrium. In such a
situation, the possibility of small weights being moved to one or the
other side of the balance makes for stability. If the world is divided
into two great power combinations, no such equilibrating device exists
and the moment one or both of the combinations considers war in-
evitable or probable, that one against which time appears to be running
is likely to begin hostilities.37
The world is not yet committed to a two power structure. Britain
and France maintain independent positions. China may develop
sufficient unity to engage in power politics. Some of the lesser states
have successfully resisted absorption in the sphere of any super-power.
The conditions, however, are far less favorable to a stable equilibrium
37. WNRiGHT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 332,755, 763.
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than they were in the nineteenth century or even in the inter-war
periodA5
In this situation statesmen have been temporizing, attempting to
reach agreements on one point after another without marked success,
It does not seem likely that such measures will create confidence and
security unless in the long run they tend to develop organizations and
opinions better adapted to the conditions of science and technology in
the modem world. These conditions appear to be such that a balance of
military power cannot be stable and will become progressively less
stable as the techniques of, nuclear fission spread to all of the great
powers.
FEDERATION OR EMPIRE
It may be that the price of stability will be a rapid transition to a
system which can give security through adequately enforced world
law. That is the contention of the numerous organizations urging
world federation.39 Perhaps the same thought is in the minds of those
who suggest that a preventive war may become necessary. 4 The
federalists, however, seem not to realize sufficiently the barriers which
the present state of opinion and of organization in the world offers to
their proposal. 41 The advocates of preventive war have not sufficiently
realized that security by that means implies universal conquest and
assumption of the burdens of world empire by the victor.4" Further-
more, it does not seem likely that the United States, at least, could
find support in its own public opinion for initiating a war which in-
ternational law and numerous political pronouncements of the United
Nations would brand as aggression and would consider sufficient
grounds for criminally indicting the responsible officials of the ag-
gressor government.
In spite of these obstacles it may be that the only alternatives ac-
tually before the world are a form of world federation or of world
empire. It does not seem likely that a stable balance of power can be
38. Win. T. R. Fox writes, however, "Since the centers of greatest power are more
widely separated than heretofore, the new military situation makes it enormously difficult
for one super-power to defeat another. Wars between the powers of first rank will neces-
sarily be protracted, far-flung, and indecisive. All ought therefore to be anxious to avoid
such a conflict. . . . Relatively small variations in military power will not jeopardize the
military security of any of the super-powers. The possibility of settling disputes by com-
pr9mise or by reference to the merits of the dispute ought correspondingly to be enlarged."
Fox, THE SUPER-POWERS (1944) 22, 23. This was written before Hiroshima, and since that
event Dr. Fox [THE ABSOLUTE WEAPON (Brodie, ed., 1946) 178, 196-7] seems to have less
faith in an equilibrium dependent on retaliation than some of his colleagues (id. at 16, 76,
134).
39. STREIT, UNION Now (1939); REvE S, THE ANATOMY OF PEACE (1945).
40. Wolfers in THE ABSOLUTE WEAPON (Brodie, ed., 1946) 116.
41. WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 1,at 982-6.
42. Id. at 117, 963, 969.
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restored. It is even less likely that there will be such a firm and uni-
versal acceptance of ethical or legal norms that force will be controlled
by self-restraint. In democratic countries the choice of federation,
emphasizing consent, as opposed to empire, emphasizing coercion, is
logical and obvious. Critics of the present state of world organization
in democratic countries are likely to evaluate a system of world politics
as bad if it depends on "power politics" or is directed by "pressure
groups" and to evaluate a system as good if it rests upon "law" and is
guided by "world public opinion." President Wilson summarized the
aims of the United States on July 4, 1918 as "The reign of law, based
upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opin-
ion of mankind." That summed up, he thought, the objectives of the
Fourteen Points and of his other war speeches. It may also be said to
sum up the Atlantic Charter and the other United Nations declarations
of World War II. That opinion, however, is by no means realized in
the United Nations Charter. Perhaps the "federalists" are right in
believing that a world organization which realized the Vilsonian
opinion would be better adapted to the material conditions of the
* world than is the organization which exists.
However that may be, power politics is today the basis of the world's
political organization and the number of states which can actively
participate in that game is small. The world is moving toward two
great centers of power, the United States and the Soviet Union, each
bringing the lesser states in its neighborhood under its protection and
producing points of insoluble disagreement where those great regions
meet in China, in Germany, in the Balkans, and in the Middle East.
Pressure groups of universal character such as the Communist party,
the Catholic church, the great business cartels and combinations exer-
cise a certain influence. In fact, the International Labor Organization
is constitutionally constructed to develop such pressure groups in the
economic field representing respectively capital and labor. The in-
fluence of such pressure groups, however, in view of the present control
of armaments by states is likely for a considerable period to be small in
comparison with the influence of the great states. Pressure groups are
more likely to be agencies of the principal actors in power politics than
checks upon them, although the influence of supra-national pressure
groups wielding great blocks of opinion within the states themselves
cannot be entirely discounted.
International law, as interpreted in the nineteenth century, em-
phasized the territorial state as the exclusive subject of that law, and
emphasized the sovereignty of such states including the rights to make
war, to remain neutral, to refuse to settle disputes by judicial pro-
cedures, and to veto the application of international legislation to
itself. It assumed the success of power politics in maintaining a stable
equilibrium. It could not give security through law. International
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law must be reinterpreted in the spirit of its great founders of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, if it is to provide security for the
members of the world community under present conditions. It must
outlaw aggressive war, require pacific settlement, eliminate the liberum
veto on international legislation and sanctions, and recognize the
individual as subject to liabilities and entitled to rights under its rules.
The latter is particularly important if the world community is to ac-
cept the democratic theory that the state is for man, not man for the
state, under material conditions which make the entire world a com-
paratively small neighborhood. 43
Such a reinterpretation implies, however, a world opinion prepared
to subordinate the nation to the world in the fields regulated by inter-
national law and to support a world organization able to enforce that
opinion. Such a world public opinion is today a hope rather than a
reality. The only publics that have effective opinions are national
publics and, to a limited extent, certain supra-national pressure groups.
The problem of world organization is the problem of creating an
opinion, permeating the public of every important nation, prepared to
subordinate immediate national interests to world law.
THE PROBLEM FOR STATESMEN
The world is at a cross road. Conditions will no longer permit a
stable balance of power. Opinion will not yet permit a stable world
federation. The drift may be, as it has been in similar situations in past
civilizations, toward a new world war which might eventuate either in
a world empire or in such complete destruction that technology and
science would decline in a new dark age. The only rational solution
appears to be temporizing adjustment of security problems through
skilful diplomacy which carefully distinguishes the essence of national
opinions which cannot be safely compromised from lesser issues where
accommodation is possible, while within the United Nations and its
subsidiary organizations federalism is built as rapidly as possible. 44
The United Nations represents the limit to which present world
opinion will go in the direction of world federation. It must not be
sacrificed because it is not perfect. Rather it must be the foundation
on which to build as evolving opinion permits.
The Charter itself directs the United Nations to reach down to the
individual through the protection of individual human rights and co-
operation in promoting universal human interests. The Nuernberg
43. Wright, International Law and the World Order in THE FOUNDATIONS OF A MORE
STABLE WORLD ORDER (LAVES, ed., 1941) 107 et seg. WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 907-
16,935-52.
44. Dulles, Thoughts on Soviet Foreign Policy and What to Do About It (1946) 20 Limn
No. 22 at 112; id., No. 23 at 118.
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trial suggests the further possibility of promoting world federalism by
establishing the responsibility before an international tribunal of
individuals for crimes against the law of nations. The Department of
State's report on the international control of atomic energy and the
statement of the American representative on the United Nations
Atomic Energy Commission suggest direct administration of one
universal interest through an authority functioning within the territory
of all states.
Through the development of such practices, the United Nations
might assume a more federal character than it now has. Furthermore
such practices might develop a world opinion aware of the necessity of
giving the United Nations a degree of authority and power able to
develop law to meet the needs of the contemporary world and to
create a sense of security among all peoples, nations, states and govern-
ments under that law.
These proposals recognize the inconsistency between the measures
necessary to maintain equilibrium among the great powers within the
United Nations in order to gain time, and the measures necessary to
develop a world opinion which will permit the United Nations to be-
come a government able to develop and maintain world law. It is idle
to talk of a world state without a world state of mind. It is idle to talk
of security through law when there is no world state. It is idle to urge
governments to abandon primary reliance upon their own power when
world law cannot give them security. It is unlikely that the use of
national power in preventive war would create conditions favorable
to the development of a world state of mind. Conquest is more likely
to lead to empire dependent upon force than to federation dependent
upon consent.45
The statesmen of the world are faced by the dilemma that they can-
not organize a stable balance of power and they cannot rely on law for
security. The people do not want to submit their national sovereignties
either to world empire or to world federation. The dilemma is one
which is difficult to solve by abstract logic and will have to await the
logic of history. Conditions and opinions are out of harmony. It be-
longs to statesmen to utilize the opinions that exist in order to create
what stability they can under existing conditions while they strive to
educate opinion to broader horizons. They must judge from moment
to moment how far they can go in balancing power without stultifying
the law of the United Nations, how far they can go in subordinating
national opinion to that law without risking war. In that task a day-by-
day analysis of the state of opinion in each of the super-powers and in
the world as a whole might be an important guide. It is unlikely that
45. WRiGHT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 117, 963, 969. But see ALE.mKDEn, OUR AGE o'
UNREASON (1942) 331.
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without quantitative measurements of opinion statesmen can keep the
ship of world peace in the narrow course between the rocks of national
opinions buttressed by the sovereignty of states and the whirlpool of a
still inchoate world opinion not yet aware of itself in a world which
rapidly shrinks as technology and science advance.
TASKS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS
The. General Assembly and the Security Council may by their resolu-
tions give some evidence of the state of opinion, but more precise evi-
dence is needed. The direction, intensity, homogeneity and con-
tinuity of the opinions of each important public toward other nations
and toward the United Nations and its policies can be measured and
such measurement might well be undertaken by the Secretariat. For
this purpose it would be necessary to collect systematic samplings of
opinions expressed in the press, in questionnaires and in elections at
frequent intervals. 46 If the opinions of the important publics were
known in all their dimensions, the agencies of the United Nations might
circulate information to conform those opinions more closely to world
conditions. This, however, would only be possible if United Nations
debates, resolutions and documents were assured free and immediate
access by radio and press to every important public. If iron curtains
continue to isolate opinion in any great area of the world, statesmen
will lack the only guide which could keep them from steering into
disaster, and such opinions may depart further and further from the
conditions of the world.
The United Nations may, as already suggested, bring itself into
direct contact with the people of the world by international cooperation
in matters of common interest such as health, communication, com-
merce, education and standards of living; by promoting universal
respect for fundamental human rights and individual responsibility for
fundamental human duties; by administering directly vital human
interests like atomic energy; and by disseminating abundant informa-
tion concerning its policies and problems. By such activities the
United Nations may in time transform itself into a federal order. In
the meantime it must carry on programs of opinion measurement and
analysis among all the major publics of the world for the guidance of
diplomacy, both within and outside the Security Council. With such
information, statesmen may be able to maintain an unstable and
hazardous balance of power until the peoples of the world by becoming
accustomed to the functioning of the United Nations are prepared to
support improvements in its structure and powers.
46. WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1087-89, 1207-11, 1466-81.
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